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United States corporations are increasingly interested in making direct invest-
ments in Eastern European countries. The likelihood of expanding opportunities
for such investments in the near future focuses attention on how such investments
can be structured to produce the most favorable U.S. and foreign tax treatment.
Many of these investments are likely to be made on a joint venture1 basis with
equity owned in part by the U.S. investing corporation and in part by local
interests. In addition, the establishment of wholly owned subsidiaries will be
feasible in a number of these countries.
One possibility to be considered by a U.S. corporation making an investment
in a business enterprise in one of the Eastern European countries is having the
investment held, not by the U.S. corporation itself, but by a wholly owned
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sistance of Richard C. Pugh, Distinguished Professor of Law, University of San Diego, in the
preparation of this article.
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**The manuscript of this article was finished in November 1991. Thus, new legislation, in
particular in the Eastern European countries, might have been enacted between then and the date of
publication. The author wishes to emphasize that most of the information on East European law
appearing in this article had to be derived from secondary sources since complete translations of
statutes hardly exist. Precise citations regarding East European law therefore could for the most part
not be supplied.
1. In common parlance, the phrase joint venture refers to any business enterprise in which the
equity is divided between two or more participants; it does not imply any particular form of business
organization. For purposes of this article, however, the phrase will generally refer to enterprises
organized as companies enjoying limited liability. In a few countries of Eastern Europe ajoint venture
can also be organized in the form of a partnership. The partnership form, however, is not commonly
used.
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holding company organized under the laws of Austria. Under certain circum-
stances, the use of such a holding company is likely to result in substantial tax
savings.
This article discusses the foreign and U.S. tax aspects of the use by a U.S.
corporation of a wholly owned Austrian holding company to effect a direct
investment in a number of Eastern European countries. It begins, after a brief
overview, with a general summary of certain investment conditions and the
current tax rates in the Eastern European countries of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia,
Hungary, Poland, and Romania. 2 An examination is then provided of various
aspects of Austrian corporate and tax law applicable to holding companies or-
ganized under Austrian law. Thereafter follows a comparison of the use of an
Austrian company to hold direct investments in Eastern Europe with the use of
a holding company organized under the laws of a number of other countries
frequently used for this purpose, including Switzerland, the Netherlands, and
Cyprus. Finally, the article provides a review of the U.S. tax rules relevant to the
possible use of a foreign holding company.
I. Overview
Under the participation privilege exemption of the Austrian corporate tax law,
dividends received by an Austrian holding company with respect to an equity
interest of at least 25 percent of the outstanding shares of a foreign company are
exempt from Austrian corporate tax.3 In addition, Austria has entered into a
number of treaties with Eastern European countries to eliminate double taxation.
Under the treaties the withholding taxes that may be imposed by the source
country on dividends, interest, and royalties paid by a local corporation to an
Austrian holding corporation are lower than the withholding tax rates that would
apply to such payments made directly to a U.S. corporation. If and when divi-
dends are paid by the Austrian holding company to the U.S. parent, a 5 percent
Austrian withholding tax is imposed. This represents an additional tax cost of the
holding company structure to the extent that such dividends are paid. However,
in some cases the reduction in withholding tax in the Eastern European country
mandated by such country's treaty with Austria is greater than the 5 percent
Austrian withholding tax. These factors suggest that significant tax savings may
be achievable in some cases by interposing an Austrian holding company be-
tween a U.S. investing corporation and the Eastern European operating corpo-
ration that is the target of the investment.
For example, if a U.S. corporation acquired directly a 51 percent stock interest
in a Czechoslovakian corporation, dividends paid by the latter to its U.S. parent
2. Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union are not dealt with in this article since the recent
upheavals in these countries render it largely impossible to make statements about prevailing laws
with any degree of precision.
3. Certain other prerequisites to the exemption are discussed below.
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corporation would be subject to a Czech withholding tax of 25 percent. However,
if the stock is owned by an Austrian holding company, under the terms of the
Austrian-Czechoslovakian Tax Treaty, the Czech dividend withholding tax
would be limited to 10 percent. The dividend would also be exempt from Aus-
trian corporate tax. The reduction in Czech withholding tax would more than
outweigh the 5 percent Austrian withholding tax on dividends paid by the Aus-
trian holding company to its U.S. parent.
The potential advantage of interposing an Austrian holding company would be
eliminated if and when the U.S. enters into tax treaties with each of the Eastern
European countries that reduce withholding tax rates in the source country on
dividends, interest, and royalties to the levels that apply under the existing
Austrian tax treaties with these countries.
II. General Economic Situation and Joint Venture
Laws in Eastern European Countries
In view of the recent dramatic developments in the former Eastern Bloc
countries, a few comments may be offered on the general business environment
in this part of the world, and more specifically on some special aspects of real
estate and corporate law, before addressing certain aspects of the pertinent East-
ern European tax laws.
A. GENERAL BUSINEss ENVIRONMENT
Some Eastern European countries, most notably Czechoslovakia and Hungary,
have relatively developed economies (including skilled labor, infrastructure, and
industrial tradition), in sharp contrast to others, such as Bulgaria and Romania.
Nevertheless, the economic climate in all the countries being surveyed is typified
by the need for western capital, technology, and know-how. The fledgling de-
mocracies of Eastern Europe are anxious to emulate western standards and hope
to do so particularly by encouraging investors from the west to form joint
ventures with local enterprises, which would facilitate a transfer of capital,
technology, and entrepreneurial spirit. Consequently, new legislation aimed at
attracting western investment, primarily by way of joint ventures, but also in
various other forms, has been passed in all countries under discussion. Apart
from such "external" measures, privatization programs are under way, espe-
cially in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, and governments are trying diligently to
enact new laws, such as corporation and tax codes, necessitated by the transition
from a controlled to a market economy. Laws that only recently have been
adopted are often revised again very quickly, which adds to the difficulty of
western investors seeking to implement their strategic business decisions. In
addition, principally as a result of the language barrier, western attorneys face the
problem of "accessibility" of new legislation, while most domestic lawyers are
poorly trained as well as inexperienced in handling complicated transactions.
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Another significant problem is the absence of western-type accounting prin-
ciples. Under the prior regimes, reasonably informative financial statements did
not exist because the distinction between equity capital and debt capital was
either unknown or simply not utilized, and assets were frequently revalued in an
unprincipled fashion when necessary in the light of such factors as the urgent
need to meet five-year-plan targets. Legislative revisions will gradually remedy
this problem. For the time being, western investors might overcome some dif-
ficulties in this regard through specifically tailored provisions in the joint venture
agreement governing accounting treatment if they are unable to reach an agree-
ment that generally accepted international accounting principles will apply.
Like many third world countries, Eastern European countries have attempted
to encourage the desired level of inward investment by entering into treaties with
western countries on the protection of investment. Austria, like some other
industrialized countries, has concluded such treaties with Hungary, Poland, and
Romania.4 A treaty with Czechoslovakia was recently entered into; another one
with Bulgaria is currently under negotiation. Apart from bilateral treaties, the
domestic laws of a fair number of Eastern European countries already accord a
certain degree of protection against nationalization and expropriation.5
B. REAL ESTATE LAW
A highly visible tenet of public policy in all countries of Eastern Europe is to
protect the country from being "sold out" to and dominated by the western
economies. In this respect, real estate is a particularly sensitive issue. In Bul-
garia, for example, joint ventures are not accorded the right to acquire title to real
property. They are generally relegated to leaseholds that may be obtained for a
period of up to seven years.
In Czechoslovakia and Hungary foreigners generally may not purchase real
property, though it is possible to set up a wholly foreign-owned corporation that,
in turn, is permitted to acquire such property. However, Czechoslovakia has an
exception to this rule: a foreigner is able to acquire title to real estate directly if
the purchase takes place in conjunction with the privatization of enterprises
currently being implemented. Polish law recognizes privately owned real prop-
erty in general, but joint ventures need permission from the Ministry of Internal
Affairs to acquire real estate if the domestic interest is less than 50 percent. In
Romania foreign investors are in general prohibited from owning land.
C. CORPORATE LAW
In the majority of the countries being reviewed the establishment of a joint
venture, or where possible, the setting up of a 100 percent foreign-owned cor-
4. BGBI 339/1989 (Hungary); BGBI 473/1989 (Poland); BGBI 553/1977 (Romania).
5. See, e.g., Czech Act on Companies with Foreign Participation § 22.
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poration is still subject to approval by one or more authorities, although a
tendency towards further liberalization in this regard undoubtedly exists. Apart
from approval requirements, if any, the usual practice is that a company (joint
venture or otherwise) takes on legal existence only after it applies for and is
granted registration by a court.
1. Bulgaria
Bulgarian law allows foreign investors to acquire equity in, or set up wholly
owned, limited and unlimited liability companies as well as corporations without
obtaining approval of the authorities. However, the Council of Ministers may
determine on a case-by-case basis that the establishment of limited and unlim-
ited liability companies more than 49 percent owned by foreigners, and corpo-
rations more than 20 percent owned by foreigners, shall be subject to approval. 6
All companies and corporations have to be registered with the Industry and Trade
Chamber.
2. Czechoslovakia
As of April 15, 1991, Czechoslovakia abolished the previously existing
general requirement that official permission be obtained for the establishment
of joint ventures. Now, the rule is that all companies (wholly foreign-owned
jointly by foreigners and Czech interests, and wholly owned by Czechs) may
be established without the consent of any authority merely by entry in the
company register at the competent district court. The only exception is the
establishment of companies in which another company, which is directly or
indirectly under public administration, will have an interest. In such a case
approval by the Government of the Czech Republic or the Government of the
Slovak Republic, depending on the location of the enterprise to be established,
is mandated due to the need to effect the transformation of state owned into
privately owned property under the privatization program currently being
implemented. 7
3. Hungary
Similarly, the setting up of a joint venture in Hungary requires generally
nothing more than registration with the competent commercial court. This ap-
plies as well to affiliates exclusively owned by a foreign investing entity. Only if
6. Foreign legal and physical persons may carry on economic activities according to the pro-
visions of the Decree No. 56/1989; the Regulations of Feb. 15, 1989 for the Application of Decree
No. 56/1989; and the Act on the Amendment of the Decree No. 56/1989 of Dec. 12, 1990. The
introduction of new legislation is currently being discussed.
7. The primary legislative bases for business activities of foreigners and joint ventures are the
Act on Economic Relations with Foreign Countries (No. 102/1988), as amended Apr. 19, 1990;
the Act on Enterprises With Foreign Participation (No. 173/1988), as amended Apr. 19, 1990; and
the Act on Corporations of Apr. 18, 1990.
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the enterprise is intended to engage in external trade is registration with the
Ministry for International Economic Relations also required. 8
4. Poland
In Poland, a Joint Venture Act 9 was enacted in 1989 and entered into force on
January 1, 1990. A foreign participant is required to invest a minimum of 20
percent of the equity in a joint venture, but there is no limit on the maximum
percentage of foreign equity investment. Therefore, the foreign investor may
hold a majority interest in the venture. The joint venture vehicle must be a
corporation or a limited liability company; partnerships are not available for
foreign investment. i0 To establish a joint venture, the parties must obtain a
permit from the Foreign Investment Agency before they may apply for registra-
tion of the joint venture company in the commercial register, which is adminis-
tered by the court of general jurisdiction. In individual cases the agency may
make the permit contingent on there being a minimum percentage of domestic
participation. Under a new Joint Venture Law that was passed in June 1991 and
that will become effective shortly, the general requirement to obtain permission
from the agency will be abolished.
5. Romania
The establishment of a company in Romania, which is possible without the
involvement of domestic investors, requires registration of an application with
the Romanian Development Agency. If no reply is received within one month,
the application will be considered approved and the investor may proceed with
the investment under the terms and conditions set forth in the application.l1




Bulgaria generally taxes corporate income at a flat rate of 40 percent. How-
ever, companies with a foreign participation exceeding both 49 percent of the
equity capital and a net worth of U.S. $100,000 or its equivalent in convertible
8. The primary legislative instruments providing the bases for business activities of foreigners
and joint ventures are Act No. VI/1988 on Business Companies and Act No. XXIV/1988 on the
Investment of Foreigners, as amended by Act No. XCVIII/1990.
9. Act on Economic Activity with the Participation of Foreign Parties (No. 74, item 442/1989).
10. Zbigniew M. Slupinski, Summary of Joint Venture Legislation in Poland, 18 INT'L Bus.
LAW. 401, 402 (1990).
11. A new Foreign Investment Law so providing was passed and promulgated in April 1991. See
also Steven M. Glick, Romania's Foreign Investment Law, 19 INT'L Bus. LAW. 295 (1991).
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currency enjoy a preferential rate of 30 percent. Irrespective of the place of
operation or the percentage and amount of foreign investment involved, a par-
ticular participation privilege is available that reduces the tax rate on dividend
income received by a joint venture to 10 percent. However, this will usually not
assume importance as joint ventures rarely receive dividends. In addition, Bul-
garia favors corporations operating in free trade zones;' 2 such entities enjoy a
complete income tax exemption during the first five years of operation, followed
by a reduced rate of 20 percent.
2. Czechoslovakia
In Czechoslovakia, the rate at which the income of a joint venture is taxed
varies with the foreign investor's stake in the venture. Preferential treatment is
accorded only to enterprises with a foreign participation in excess of 30 percent.
If this requirement is met, a tax of 20 percent on the first Kcs 200,000 of income,
increasing to 40 percent on any income in excess thereof, is imposed. If the
foreign participation is 30 percent or less, the entity is put on par with all other
Czech companies, which are subject to a tax of 20 percent on the first Kcs
200,000 of annual taxable income and a tax of 55 percent on any taxable income
in excess of Kcs 200,000. The Ministry of Finance may reduce or completely
waive income taxation for a period of up to two years starting with the inception
of operations.
3. Hungary
Hungary's revised provisions on income taxation became effective January 1,
1991.13 Compared with the previous legislation they represent a change for the
worse in many respects. For example, the preexisting two-tiered rates of 35
percent applicable to the first three million forints of income and 40 percent
applicable to any income in excess thereof have given way to a general flat rate
of 40 percent. Also, preferential treatment of foreign investment was reduced.
However, some advantages for major investments in the manufacturing sector of
the economy remain in effect. If the foreign participation in the joint venture
reaches a minimum of 30 percent with an initial equity contribution in the
amount of at least Ft 50 million, the income tax is reduced to 16 percent during
the first five years and to 24 percent between the sixth and the tenth year of
operation. The same applies with regard to profits derived from the operation of
hotels constructed by the venture. Tax holidays of five years with a preferential
income tax rate of 16 percent between the sixth and tenth year of operation are
granted if an investment in a "very important" manufacturing sector, such as the
automotive industry, meets the above requirements.
12. Such companies are required to conduct their entire business in hard currency.
13. Profit Taxation Act (IX/1988), as amended (XCIX/1990). The new provisions also affect to
some extent joint ventures set up before 1991.
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4. Poland
In Poland, corporate taxes are generally assessed at a rate of 40 percent.
However, joint venture companies are exempt from corporate tax altogether for
a period of three years. These tax holidays may be extended for an additional
three years if the enterprise is operating in a preferred sector, such as production
of housing materials, electronics, communications, transportation, or tourism. 14
Yet, under a new joint venture law that was passed in June 1991, tax holidays
will no longer be granted on a general basis.
5. Romania
Romania currently imposes income tax at a 30 percent rate on joint venture
profits. Romania allows tax holidays for the first two to five years of operation
depending on the industrial factor in which the investment is made. In addition,
a reduction of the regular income tax rate will be granted after the expiration of
the initial tax holidays. The reduction will be 50 percent for profits that are
reinvested in certain key industries in Romania and 25 percent for profits that are
generated from certain qualifying operations (for example, at least 50 percent of
the products and services are exported, more than 10 percent of the expenditures
are invested in research and development, and the like). 15
B. CAPITAL GAINS
Few of the tax laws of the Eastern European countries surveyed explicitly
provide for the taxation of capital gains realized by the foreign investor upon the
sale or other disposition of shares in a wholly owned or a joint venture company.
Countries with no pertinent provisions will presumably apply their regular in-
come tax regime with respect to such capital gains in cases where there is no tax
treaty assigning the exclusive right to tax capital gains to the shareholder's
country. Czech tax authorities, for instance, take the position that capital gain
realized upon the alienation of an interest in a Czech company owned by a
foreigner is subject to the above-mentioned two-tiered rate of 20-40 percent plus
an additional 25 percent withholding tax upon the transfer of the proceeds if no
tax treaty is applicable.
C. WITHHOLDING TAXES
Nontreaty withholding tax rates as currently applicable in Eastern European
countries for dividend, interest, and royalty payments are set forth in Table 1.
Table 2 shows treaty withholding tax rates for payments to U.S. investors.
14. Slupinski, supra note 10.
15. Steven M. Glick, Romania's Foreign Investment Law, 19 INT'L Bus. LAW. 295, 295-96
(1991).
VOL. 26, NO. 2
INVESTING IN EASTERN EUROPE 311
TABLE 1
DOMESTIC LAW WITHHOLDING TAX RATES CURRENTLY
APPLICABLE IN EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES
Dividends Interest Royalties
Bulgaria 10% 15% 15%
Czechoslovakia 25% 25% 25/30%'
Hungary 0% 0% 20%
Poland 30% 30% 30%
Romania 2  10% 15% 25%
'The reduced rate applies to industrial and know-how royalties.2New legislation is about to be adopted.
TABLE 2
WITHHOLDING TAX RATES FOR DIVIDENDS, INTEREST, AND ROYALTIES
PAID BY AN EASTERN EUROPEAN SUBSIDIARY TO A U.S. CORPORATION
Dividends Interest Royalties
Bulgaria' 10% 15% 15%
Czechoslovakia 25% 25% 30%
Hungary 5/15%2 0% 0%
Poland 5/15%3  0% 10%
Romania 10% 10% 10/15%4
'No treaty is in effect, but negotiations have been initiated.2No withholding tax is imposed under domestic Hungarian law at the moment. The reduced rate under
the treaty would apply if the beneficial owner is a company owning at least 10 percent of the voting
stock of the payor.
'The reduced rate applies if the recipient is a company directly holding 10 percent or more of the
payor's voting stock.
'Copyright royalties are subject to the reduced rate.
D. ABSENCE OF ANTI-AVOIDANCE PROVISIONS
With respect to antitreaty shopping and other anti-avoidance provisions, as
well as measures with the same objective based on internal law (or administrative
discretion), the Eastern European authorities, at least for the time being, do not
appear to be concerned about the underlying problem, and it may take some time
for such concern to develop. This situation can largely be attributed to the strong
interest in attracting western business investment and adopting more liberal
attitudes toward dealings with the west in general. These factors make the in-
voking of any kind of sophisticated anti-avoidance tax provisions seem unlikely
in the near future. 
16
16. Chrysses Demetriades, Doing Business with Eastern Europe Through Cyprus Double Tax
Treaties, TAx PLAN. INT'L REV., Sept. 1990, at 16, 17.
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IV. Taxation of Corporations and
Holding Companies in Austria
A. TYPES OF CORPORATIONS
Austrian law recognizes two types of legal entities similar to the corporation
of the U.S. legal system, namely the publicly held corporation (Aktiengesell-
schaft or AG) and the limited liability company (Gesellschaft mit beschrinkter
Haftung or GmbH), which must have a minimum stated share capital of S
1,000,000 and S 500,000, respectively. The GmbH may be preferable for use as
a holding company since, unlike an AG, normally no supervisory board needs to
be established and its annual financial statements need not be audited., 7 In
addition, the cost of incorporation and legal maintenance tend to be smaller in the
case of a GmbH. 18
B. CORPORATE INCOME TAXATION IN GENERAL
In general, the Corporation Tax Code 198819 provides for a flat rate of 30
percent of the taxable income of both an AG and a GmbH (both types of
companies will hereinafter be referred to as corporations). In addition, a trade tax
of about 13 percent is imposed on taxable income. This tax, however, is de-
ductible for corporate income tax purposes, so that the aggregate tax on corporate
earnings is roughly 39 percent.20
Interest and royalty income of an Austrian corporation are taxable at the above
mentioned total rate of 39 percent. Usually, however, most of such income is
channelled through a holding company that pays interest or royalties to the U.S.
parent corporation. In this case, the overall Austrian tax burden would be modest
since the interest and royalties paid by the Austrian corporation to its U.S. parent
17. Such requirements would only be imposed, inter alia, if the GmbH has more than fifty
shareholders and a stated capital exceeding AS I million or if it has on average more than 300
employees.
18. For both types of companies a 2 percent tax on the amount of equity actually contributed and
a 0.55 percent incorporation fee based on stated capital have to be paid. However, of the minimum
capital of AS I million in the case of an AG and AS 500,000 in the case of a GmbH, only one-half
has to be contributed initially.
19. CORP. TAX CODE § 22 (1988).
20. Austrian law also imposes a combined property tax (the regular property tax and the so called
Erbschaftssteuer aquivalent, or inheritance tax equivalent) at a rate of 1.5 percent per year on legal
entities, which is not deductible for corporate income tax purposes. The tax base is a special value
(Einheitswert, or unitary value) assigned to all real and personal property of a corporation by the tax
authorities, which in most cases is well below its market value. The base, however, cannot fall below
the minimum stated capital. Nevertheless, a pure holding corporation is granted a participation
privilege exemption from this tax which is applicable under the same circumstances as in the case of
corporate income tax. Valuation Act (Bewertungsgesetz) § 63.
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corporation would be fully deductible, leaving only a small excess of interest and
royalties received over interest and royalties paid subject to Austrian corporate
tax.
C. HOLDING COMPANIES IN AUSTRIA
No special tax rules govern holding companies. The domestic as well as the
international participation privilege exempting dividends and capital gains from
corporate tax at the level of the recipient apply to every corporation. The do-
mestic participation privilege exemption is unconditional; the international one is
only granted under certain circumstances. 2' The requirements for the latter ex-
emption are:
(a) At least 25 percent of the entire share capital (not of the voting power) of
a foreign affiliate must be directly owned. The law contains no require-
ment that the affiliate be "active," or, as for example in the case of the
Dutch participation exemption, that it be subject to "a comparable tax
regime."
(b) The affiliate has to be comparable to a corporation under Austrian law.
(c) No more than 25 percent of the earnings of the affiliate may be derived
from debt securities (bonds, debentures, municipal bonds, and similar
obligations) and equity in another affiliate if more than 25 percent of the
earnings of the other affiliate are derived from such debt securities, unless
the first-tier affiliate is a bank.22
(d) The participation has to be held without interruption for a minimum
period of twelve months prior to the end of the fiscal year in which the
dividend from the affiliate is received. 23
Under Austrian law, unlike the rule in some other jurisdictions having a par-
ticipation privilege exemption, losses on the value of the participation can be
deducted.2 4 They may be offset against any other taxable income of the holding
company or carried forward for a period of up to seven years .25 Expenses relating
to the acquisition of the participation, such as interest on bank loans, are not
21. CORP. TAX CODE §§ 7(4), 10(5) (as amended, 1989). The trade tax is treated similarly.
22. This seems to be a reasonable interpretation of the statute in light of the legislative history.
Case law on this point does not yet exist. The literal translation of the statutory language would read:
"The business purpose of the foreign subsidiary may not comprise to an extent exceeding 25% the
management of securities (bonds, debentures, municipal bonds and similar obligations) as well as of
equity participations in a subsidiary having such business purpose unless it is a bank."
23. CORP. TAX CODE § 10(5) (as amended, 1989).
24. See INCOME TAX CODE § 6(2)(9) (1988) (stating the so-called gemildertes Niederstwertprin-
zip, or moderated lowest value principal). This deduction holds even for unrealized losses (measured
by comparison of book and fair market value) if reflected on the balance sheet by a corresponding
write-down. Austrian accounting principles mandate such write-downs under certain circumstances.
In all other cases they are optional.
25. A loss carryback is unknown in Austrian law.
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deductible. The privilege covers not only actual and presumed dividends paid by
the subsidiary, but also capital gains resulting from the sale of the participation
if effected after the date on which the requirements for the exemption were first
met. Thus, the privilege is available for a sale of a qualifying (25 percent)
participation if at the end of the fiscal year preceding the sale such participation
has been held for at least twelve months without interruption. However, losses on
the participation deducted in prior years are recaptured 26 by being included in
taxable income when the participation is sold. The holding company is not
prevented from conducting an active business, in contrast, for example, to the
requirement applicable to Swiss holding companies. Nor is there a penalty tax or
any other fiscal disadvantage associated with the accumulation of earnings sim-
ilar to the accumulated earnings tax in the United States.
D. TREATY NETWORK WITH EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES
Austria is the only member country in the Organization for Economic Coop-
eration and Development (OECD) that has entered into tax treaties with all
Eastern European countries. Table 3 indicates the treaty rates of withholding
taxes currently imposed in the Eastern European countries on dividends, interest,
and royalties paid to an Austrian holding company. None of the treaties has any
anti-avoidance or anti-treaty shopping provisions, except that the treaties with
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania contain general clauses pre-
cluding withholding tax reductions to the extent that interest and royalties exceed
an arm's length level. In particular, no treaty contains antitreaty shopping clauses
restricting treaty benefits to entities beneficially owned by local residents similar
to those found in many newer tax treaties.
TABLE 3
WITHHOLDING TAX RATES FOR DIVIDENDS, INTEREST, AND ROYALTIES
PAID BY AN EASTERN EUROPEAN SUBSIDIARY TO AN AUSTRIAN COMPANY
Dividends Interest Royalties
Bulgaria 0% 0% 0%
Czechoslovakia 10% 0% 0/5%'
Hungary 10%2 0% 0%
Poland 10% 0% 0%
Romania 15% 10% 10%
'Five percent withholding tax for industrial and know-how royalties.2At present no withholding tax is imposed under domestic Hungarian law.
26. CORP. TAX CODE § 10(5) (as amended, 1989).
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In some respects the treaty with Bulgaria does not follow the OECD model; its
effect, however, is in most instances the same. For example, the definition of
royalties is narrower, which may seem disadvantageous in light of the exemption
from withholding tax applicable to royalties, but royalties that are not covered by
the royalty provision are exempted from Bulgarian tax in any event. Royalties
fall within the definition of those business profits that are generally exempt from
tax in the source country if they are not attributable to a permanent establishment
maintained there by the taxpayer.
27
E. No AUSTRIAN ANTI-AvOIDANCE PROVISIONS
Austrian domestic law itself does not contain any provisions designed to
counter treaty shopping; nor is there any anti-avoidance legislation directed
against conduit companies. 28 The Federal Tax Code contains only general anti-
abuse clauses. 29 But even in this respect there is virtually no risk that these
provisions will be invoked in connection with an interposed holding company
since their application would simply result in disregarding the Austrian holding
company as a conduit or a sham, which would leave Austria with no tax claim
at all. By the same token, denial of deductions for what purports to be interest
on a debt owed by an Austrian corporation to a controlling shareholder on the
basis of notions of thin capitalization or excessive debt-equity ratios are unknown
to Austrian statutory law. However, the anti-abuse provisions could be invoked
to achieve this result. Austrian practitioners often recommend that the debt-
equity ratio not exceed 15 to 1 in order to effectively immunize against attack on
thin capitalization grounds.
F. UNITED STATEs-AUSTRIAN TAX TREATY
Under the United States-Austrian tax treaty, a 5 percent withholding tax is
imposed upon the distribution of dividends by an Austrian holding company to
a U.S. investor, assuming that the investor's direct or indirect share in the entire
voting stock of the Austrian holding company is at least 95 percent. In addition,
no more than 25 percent of the gross income of the payor may be derived from
interest and dividends unless such interest or dividends are received from lower-
27. ALFRED PHILLIP, HELMUT LOUKOTA, ROBERT POLLAK, INTERNATIONALES STEUERRECHT BGI I
(2d ed.).
28. Reiter, Report from Austria 47, in KLUWER LAW AND TAXATION PUBLISHERS, TREATY SHOP-
PING (1989).
29. FEDERAL TAX CODE §§ 22-23 (1961). Section 22 reads: "(1) A valid tax claim cannot be
avoided or reduced by an abuse of forms or concepts of the civil law. (2) Where such abuse occurs,
taxes become payable according to the ordinary rules." Section 23 reads: "Fictitious activities are
ignored for the tax claim. If a fictitious transaction conceals another transaction, the concealed
transaction is decisive for the tax claim."
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tier subsidiaries. 30 Capital gains upon the disposition of the holding company
shares are not taxable in Austria provided that the shares are owned by a U.S.
enterprise and not an individual. 3' Under articles VII and VIII of the tax treaty
Austria has waived the right to levy any withholding tax on interest and royalty
payments if the U.S. recipient has no permanent establishment in Austria.
32
V. Comparison Between Austria and Certain
Other Holding Company Countries
A number of countries other than Austria have frequently been selected as the
domicile for a foreign holding company. Therefore, it is useful to compare the
advantages of Austria as a domicile for a holding company for direct investments
in Eastern Europe with the situations in Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Cy-
prus. Other European countries, such as Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, or the
Channel Islands, which are occasionally selected as the domicile of a holding
company, are not dealt with here because of the lack of tax treaty networks
between such countries and Eastern European countries.
A. SWITZERLAND
Switzerland offers, apart from relatively low corporate tax rates in general, the
possibility of establishing holding, as well as so-called domiciliary, companies
both of which enjoy preferential treatment under cantonal tax laws. Generally
speaking, a company has to hold substantial investments in the equity capital of
other companies on a long-term basis and dividends derived from such invest-
ments must constitute its principal form of income in order to qualify for holding
company status. The prescribed ratios of equity participation to other assets and
dividend to other income, including interest and royalty income, vary from
canton to canton. If the required criteria are met, most cantons grant a total
exemption from cantonal and communal taxes. If a company does not qualify for
holding company status, it may be treated as a domiciliary company, provided it
is not engaged in active business in Switzerland and does not hold title to Swiss
real estate. In most cantons, either a domiciliary company is entirely exempt
from income tax or a reduced rate may be negotiated with the competent tax
authorities.
30. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income, Oct. 25,
1956, U.S.-Aus., art. VI, 8 U.S.T. 1699. In all other cases the rate is 12.5 percent, which is 50
percent of the rate applicable under internal Austrian law. As an anti-avoidance measure, the normal
rate will also be imposed if the relationship of the two companies is found to be arranged or
maintained primarily with the intention of securing the reduced rate. Id.
31. Id. art. III.
32. Losses resulting from the holding company's receiving lower interest or royalty payments
from the operating subsidiary than those received by the U.S. investing company will not be
recognized. See id. arts. VII-VIII. This is an unchallenged administrative practice. See also GERMAN
INCOME TAX CODE § 34(c), which so provides explicitly.
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Federal tax law recognizes neither holding nor domiciliary status as such.
However, under the Swiss participation privilege exemption, dividend income is
exempt from federal income taxation in general if the related investment repre-
sents at least 20 percent of the affiliate's share capital or has a minimum book
value of two million Swiss francs.
Although Swiss holding and domiciliary companies might be thought of as
attractive offshore vehicles for the purpose of investing in Eastern Europe, the
tax treaty network between Switzerland and Eastern European countries is lim-
ited. Besides a treaty with the former Soviet Union, only treaties with Hungary
and Romania exist. But they do not confer advantages with respect to applicable
withholding tax rates as compared to the withholding tax rates applicable under
the national tax laws of these countries. A tax treaty with Czechoslovakia is
currently contemplated, but it is still unclear whether and when it will be signed.
The tax treaty between the United States and Switzerland provides for withhold-
ing tax rates on dividends of 5 or 15 percent as in the case of Austria. Swiss law
does not impose withholding tax on the payment of interest and royalties.
Unlike the situation in the case of Austria, tax planners have to be wary of
particular anti-avoidance legislation 33 if the routing of an investment via
Switzerland is contemplated. The general thrust of the legislation in question is
that the reduction or waiver of withholding taxes (tax benefit) provided for
under Swiss tax treaties shall not benefit persons who, although by the letter of
the treaty entitled to a tax benefit, are thought to claim such tax relief abusively.
A tax benefit is, deemed to be claimed abusively if, among other things, it
relates to income a substantial part of which is directly or indirectly used to
satisfy the claims of persons not entitled to the treaty benefits. This covers, in
particular, interest and royalty conduit arrangements, such as a holding com-
pany that uses a substantial part (more than one half) of its foreign source
income, in respect of which a treaty tax benefit is claimed, to pay debt interest
or royalties to its shareholder, which, in turn, is not entitled to benefits under
the treaty concerned. A tax benefit is also regarded as claimed abusively if it
relates to income that benefits a legal person residing in Switzerland that does
not make appropriate profit distributions and in which persons not entitled to the
treaty benefits hold, directly or indirectly, a substantial equity participation or
are otherwise interested. 34
B. THE NETHERLANDS
Dutch law provides for a participation privilege exemption comparable to that
accorded under Austrian law. The privilege is available under Dutch statutory
law, but in cases involving any unusual features the taxpayer ordinarily applies
33. Decree of the Federal Council Concerning Measures Against the Improper Use of Tax
Conventions Concluded by the Swiss Confederation on Dec. 14, 1962.
34. De Coulon, Report from Switzerland 261, in KLUWER, supra note 28.
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for a ruling from the Dutch tax authorities. Some notable differences between the
Austrian and Dutch participation privilege exemption are:
3 5
(a) Under the Dutch privilege the parent company's stake in the affiliate
needs to be only 5 percent.
(b) Unlike in Austria, the passive nature of the holding company may jeop-
ardize the exemption of dividend income from Dutch income tax. In
some cases, for example, a positive ruling might be conditioned on the
holding company's performance of at least some activities. If the Dutch
holding company is passive and, at the same time, is a subsidiary of an
active foreign company and holds a participation of less than 50 percent
in the operating subsidiary, an exemption privilege ruling is not likely to
be granted.
(c) Unlike in Austria, losses incurred on the sale or disposition of shares of
affiliates to which the participation exemption applies are not deductible.
Losses are deductible only if they are realized upon liquidation of the
subsidiary and if certain conditions are met. The main requirement for the
deductibility of liquidation losses is that the Dutch parent company have
had a participation of at least 25 percent in the foreign affiliate concerned
during a minimum period of five years prior to the liquidation.
(d) The nonresident affiliate has to be subject to a "comparable tax
regime' '-some sort of income tax-in its country of domicile. How-
ever, being subject to an income tax regime in principle suffices so that,
for instance, even a tax holiday of up to ten years would not preclude
application of the participation exemption.
(e) Interest and royalty payments funnelled through to the investor are likely
to be subject to a higher tax burden in the Netherlands than in Austria.
The Dutch tax authorities require that certain minimum percentages of
the gross interest and royalty receipts of a holding company be taxable, 36
whereas no such requirement is imposed in Austria-a disadvantage that,
like the restrictions mentioned above under (b) and (c), might be signif-
icant depending on the particular nature of the investment.
Dutch corporate income tax is imposed at a rate of 40 percent decreasing to 35
percent for amounts exceeding 250,000 guilder compared to a maximum tax of
about 39 percent in Austria. Neither country withholds tax on interest or royalties
paid to a U.S. investor. As in the case of Austria, dividends paid by a wholly
owned Dutch holding company to its U.S. parent corporation are subject to a
withholding tax of 5 percent.37
35. Janbert L.D. Burggraaf, Participation Exemption in The Netherlands, TAx PLAN. INT'L REV.,
Jan. 1991, at 20.
36. Janbert L.D. Burggraaf, Niederlindische Holdinggesellschaften, in WIRTSCHAFrSRECHTLICHE
BLATrER 133, 135 (1989).
37. The reduced rate is available if, during that part of the payor's taxable year which precedes
the date of payment and the whole prior taxable year (if any), the recipient owns at least 25 percent
of the payor's voting stock (alone or together with another United States recipient, provided each
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TABLE 4
WITHHOLDING TAX RATES FOR DIVIDENDS, INTEREST,
AND ROYALTIES PAID BY AN EASTERN EUROPEAN SUBSIDIARY
TO A DUTCH HOLDING COMPANY
Dividends Interest Royalties
Bulgaria1  10% 15% 15%
Czechoslovakia 0/10%2 0% 5%
Hungary 5/15%3 0% 0%
Poland 0/15% 4  0% 0/10%
5
Romania 10/15% 4  0/10%6  10%
'No treaty is in effect.2No withholding if the resident holds at least 25 percent of payor's capital.3The reduced rate applies if the beneficial owner is a company holding directly at least 25 percent of the
ayor's capital.No withholding if the beneficial owner is a company holding directly at least 25 percent of the payor's
capital.5No withholding in case of copyright royalties.6No withholding if paid to a bank or other financial institution or in connection with a loan granted or
guaranteed by the other state of one of its institutions.
TABLE 5
WITHHOLDING TAX RATES FOR DIVIDENDS, INTEREST, AND ROYALTIES
PAID BY AN EASTERN EUROPEAN AFFILIATE TO A CYPRUS COMPANY
Dividends Interest Royalties
Bulgaria 0% 0% 0%
Czechoslovakia 10% 10% 0/5%1
Hungy 0% 0% 0%
Poland 30% 30% 30%
Romania 10% 10% 5%
'Five percent withholding tax for industrial and know-how royalties.2No treaty is in effect.
C. CYPRUS
Cyprus permits the establishment of special offshore holding companies. 38
Such a company may have nonresident shareholders only, and its business pur-
poses and activities must be wholly restricted to operating and holding invest-
ments in companies domiciled outside the country. If these criteria are met, the
company enjoys a reduced rate of tax of 4.25 percent on its net profits-a fact
does not own less than 10 percent). In addition, only 25 percent of the payor's gross income may
consist of interest and dividends other than interest and dividends received from 50 percent-owned
subsidiaries and interest derived in a banking, insurance or financing business. Convention for the
Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on
Income, July 23, 1982, U.S.-The Netherlands, art. VII, T.I.A.S. 10772, at 15.
38. Demetriades, supra note 16.
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that might prove advantageous, for example, if interest or royalties are to be
earned by the holding company and eventually distributed as dividends to a U.S.
parent corporation. Domestic legislation provides for no withholding tax on
dividends, interest, or royalties.
VI. Foreign Exchange Controls
United States corporations making direct investments in Eastern European
countries must be concerned with foreign exchange restrictions that may impede
the remittance of dividends, interest, and royalties and the repatriation of in-
vested capital in convertible currency.
A. EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES
The foreign exchange regimes of the Eastern European countries as presently
constituted may entail severe restrictions on the transfer of profits and the
repatriation of the invested capital. Although some restrictions might seem
unacceptable at the moment, the overall tendency towards liberalization will in
all likelihood bring about further relaxation of current regulations.
Currently, Czechoslovakia and Hungary have the most liberal foreign ex-
change regimes. Profits as well as amounts realized upon the liquidation of an
enterprise are transferable without restriction. All other countries in question
guarantee foreign joint venture partners at least the unlimited right to transfer
their share of after-tax profits that are earned in foreign (hard) currency. In
addition, some countries have already introduced "limited internal convertibil-
ity," under which part of the domestic currency profits may also be transferred.
Poland currently allows for 15 percent of the foreign partner's share of profit
from the previous fiscal year generated in zlotys to be exchanged into hard
currency and transferred abroad. 3 9 According to the Foreign Trade Ministry, full
convertibility will be put into force as early as 1991. 40 Similarly, Romania
permits a portion of leu profits (8 to 15 percent of the foreign investors capital
contribution) to be transferred to foreign partners.
B. AUSTRIA
Along with the adoption of a more favorable tax environment for foreign
investors, Austria has also completely liberalized its foreign exchange control
39. Treaty with Poland Concerning Business and Economic Relations, S. TREATY Doc. No. 18,
101st Cong., 2d Sess. 14-15 (1990). This percentage will increase in 1992 to 20 percent, in 1993 to
35 percent, in 1994 to 50 percent, in 1995 to 80 percent, and from 1996 on no restrictions will
remain.
40. DIE PRESSE (Vienna), June 18, 1991, at 13.
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regime. 4 There remain, as in many other countries, only reporting requirements
for the purpose of gathering statistical data.
VII. United States Tax Considerations
The U.S. tax implications of the interposition of a wholly owned Austrian
holding company between a U.S. investing corporation and a direct investment
in an Eastern European operating company are of central importance in deciding
whether to adopt such a structure. Use of a holding company will be warranted
only if tax savings can be achieved that clearly outweigh the additional costs and
administrative burdens involved in use of a holding company.
A. EFFECr OF ACCUMULATION RATHER THAN DIsTRIBUrION
OF HOLDING COMPANY INCOME
The interposition of a wholly owned foreign holding company between the
U.S. investing corporation and the foreign operating company in which the
investment is to be made has certain U.S. tax implications. In many cases
the only tax saving that can normally be achieved by accumulating in the holding
company dividends, interest, and royalties received from an Eastern European
operating company is the 5 percent Austrian withholding tax on dividends paid
to a U.S. corporation. This tax is not paid as long as the earnings are accumu-
lated rather than distributed by the holding company.
Because the wholly owned holding company will be a controlled foreign
corporation for U.S. tax purposes, the undistributed dividend, interest, and roy-
alty income it receives from the operating company will usually constitute for-
eign personal holding company income, which will be taxed as a constructive
dividend to its U.S. parent corporation.4 2 This constructive dividend will carry
with it indirect foreign tax credit for Austrian corporate income tax, if any, and
withholding taxes imposed on the income of the holding company, that is,
withholding taxes on dividend, interest, and royalty income received from the
operating company. 43 The saving of the Austrian withholding tax that can be
achieved by accumulating rather than distributing the income of the holding
company will be significant by itself if that tax cannot be credited because it
would exceed the applicable limitation on the foreign tax credit under section 904
of the Internal Revenue Code (the Code). 44
41. See, e.g., Exchange Control Regulations of the Austrian National Bank [Devisenrechtliche
(DE) Kundmachungen] DE 1/90 - DE 3/90.
42. I.R.C. §§ 954(a)(1), 954(c) (West Supp. 1991).
43. I.R.C. § 960(a) (West 1988).
44. Payment of Austrian withholding tax entitles the parent company to a direct tax credit.
I.R.C. § 901 (West Supp. 1991). The foreign tax credit limitation applies to the combined amount
of potential direct and indirect foreign tax credits. 1.R.C. § 904 (West Supp. 1991).
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B. SIGNIFICANCE OF REDUCTIONS IN WITHHOLDING
TAXES IN SOURCE COUNTRY
The most significant potential benefit of the interposed holding company typ-
ically lies not in the accumulation in the holding company of dividend and other
income received from the operating company. The benefit lies, rather, in the
reduction of the foreign withholding taxes on payments of dividends, interest,
and royalties by the foreign operating company to the holding company below
what these taxes would be if those dividends, interest, and royalties were paid by
the operating company directly to the U.S. parent company. These reductions
result under the terms of tax treaties between the country in which the holding
company is established and the country in which the operating company is
established. The treaties typically reduce or eliminate the withholding tax on
dividends, interest, and royalties paid by a corporation in one contracting state to
a recipient in the other.
The reduction in withholding taxes may be of significance to any U.S. cor-
poration that is in an excess foreign tax credit posture because the foreign tax
burden it bears exceeds the applicable foreign tax credit limitations under section
904 of the Code. The use of a holding company can reduce the total foreign tax
burden on distributed earnings of the foreign operating company below the level
that would be obtained if the earnings were distributed directly by the foreign
operating company to the U.S. parent. The reduction will be an absolute saving
to the extent that it represents tax that would not otherwise be creditable because
it exceeds the applicable section 904 foreign tax credit limitation. The excess
foreign tax credit problem can exist on an overall basis because the U.S. cor-
poration's aggregate foreign source income bears too heavy a foreign tax burden
or it can exist with respect to a specific investment in a noncontrolling interest in
a particular foreign corporation.
C. ALLEVIATION OF OVERALL OR SPECIFIC INVESTMENT
EXCESS FOREIGN TAX CREDITS
The excess foreign tax credit problem can exist because the overall foreign
operations of the U.S. corporation generate foreign source income subject to the
general foreign tax credit limitation of section 904 (d)(1)(I), and that foreign
source income bears a total foreign tax burden that exceeds the maximum U.S.
corporate tax on that income, which is here assumed to be 34 percent. This
corporation will seek to ameliorate its excess foreign tax credit problem by
assuring that general limitation income generated by a direct investment in an
Eastern European country will bear a total foreign tax burden of less than 34
percent. If this is not possible, the objective will be to minimize any foreign tax
in excess of 34 percent.
The excess foreign tax credit problem can also exist with respect to the div-
idends generated as a result of the acquisition of any 50 percent or smaller
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interest in a foreign corporation (a noncontrolling interest). In this situation, the
dividends would be subject to the special section 904 (d)(1)(E) foreign tax credit
limitation that applies to dividends from each noncontrolled section 902 corpo-
ration. Therefore these dividends could not be blended with any general limita-
tion income (or other foreign source income) for foreign tax credit limitation
purposes. In this case, if the foreign tax burden on dividends from the foreign
corporation (including corporate income tax and dividend withholding tax) ex-
ceeds 34 percent, the excess will be noncreditable. Accordingly, in this situation,
if the aggregate foreign tax burden can be reduced by lowering the foreign
dividend withholding tax, the interposition of a foreign holding company will
45produce an absolute savings in tax.
D. APPLICATION OF SECTION 904 (D)(3) LOOK-THROUGH
RULES TO CONTROLLING INVESTMENTS
As implied in the preceding paragraph, the U.S. tax picture will differ de-
pending on whether the U.S. corporation is acquiring, through its wholly owned
Austrian holding company, an interest of more than 50 percent of the voting
power or value of the stock of the Eastern European operating company or an
interest of 50 percent or less. If an interest greater than 50 percent is acquired
through the interposed holding company, the operating company will be a con-
trolled foreign corporation.46 As a result, for purposes of the U.S. foreign tax
credit limitations under section 904 of the Code, the look-through rules of section
904(d)(3) will apply to any dividends, interest, and royalties paid by the oper-
ating company to the interposed holding company. To the extent that the oper-
ating company's income, in turn, consists of operating income (such as income
from manufacturing and sales or from performing services) the dividends, in-
terest, and royalties it pays to the holding company will usually be general
limitation income subject to the general limitation of section 904(d)(1)(I).
Similarly, payments of dividends, interest, or royalties or any constructive
dividends under Subpart F of the Code from the holding company to the U.S.
parent corporation will be characterized under the look-through rules as general
limitation income. These payments can therefore be blended with other foreign-
source general limitation income of the U.S. corporation. Suppose that the
reduction in withholding taxes on dividends, interest, and royalties paid by the
Eastern European operating company to the foreign holding company brings the
total level of foreign tax on the distributed earnings of the operating company to
a level that is (i) below the level that would apply if the payments were made
directly to the U.S. corporation and (ii) below the 34 percent level of U.S. tax
45. A reduction of the aggregate foreign tax burden below 34 percent would merely shift tax
revenues to the United States.
46. Direct, indirect, and constructive ownership must be taken into account in testing whether a
foreign corporation is a controlled foreign corporation. I.R.C. §§ 957(a), 958 (West 1988).
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on the U.S. corporation's general limitation income. In this case, the reduction
will enable the cross-crediting of higher foreign taxes on other general limitation
income against the U.S. tax that would otherwise be imposed on the lower-taxed
general limitation income from the Eastern European operating company.
Assume, for example, that a U.S. corporation that has excess foreign tax
credits associated with its foreign general limitation income acquires through an
Austrian holding company a 51 percent interest in a Bulgarian joint venture
company operating in a free trade zone. The Bulgarian company enjoys a five-
year Bulgarian tax holiday. No foreign tax will be imposed on the holding
company because the Austrian-Bulgarian treaty eliminates the Bulgarian with-
holding tax. However, if the dividends were distributed directly by the Bulgarian
company to the U.S. corporation, a 10 percent Bulgarian withholding tax will be
imposed. The elimination of the Bulgarian withholding tax on dividends under
the Austrian-Bulgarian treaty enables the dividends received through the Aus-
trian holding company, which are general limitation income, 'to absorb more
excess foreign tax credit than could be absorbed if the dividends were paid
directly to the U.S. investing corporation.
Even if the reduction in withholding tax does not bring the total level of
foreign tax on the distributed earnings of the operating company below 34
percent, the reduction will represent a real savings in the combined U.S. and
foreign tax burden whenever the tax reduced would not otherwise be creditable
because it would exceed the section 904(d)(1)(I) general limitation. To revert to
the example offered at the outset, if a U.S. corporation acquired a 51 percent
stock interest in a Czech operating company, the total Czech tax burden on
dividends distributed to the U.S. investing corporation (corporate income tax of
40 percent plus a 25 percent dividend withholding tax) would exceed the 34
percent U.S. tax burden on the dividends if received directly by the U.S. cor-
poration. Accordingly, being able to reduce the withholding tax burden from 25
percent to 10 percent by interposing an Austrian holding company will result in
a real savings.
E. WITHHOLDING TAX REDucTIONS ON INTEREST AND ROYALTIES
In the case of interest and royalties paid to the Austrian holding company by
an Eastern European operating company, in which the holding company has a
controlling interest, overall tax savings may be achieved through reductions in
the withholding taxes on such payments in the source country that bring the rates
below the maximum U.S. 34 percent.47 These payments would normally be
deductible by the operating company, and therefore, the only source country tax
47. It is assumed that the withholding taxes on interest and royalties under the Austrian treaty are
lower than the rates that apply under the United States treaty with the source country. To the extent
that this is not the case, the benefit of channeling interest and royalties through an Austrian holding
company will be eliminated.
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they would bear would be the withholding tax, if any. To the extent that these
payments may be passed on by the holding company as deductible payments of
interest and royalties to the U.S. parent corporation, they will be exempt from
the corporate income tax in the country in which the holding company is orga-
nized. These payments will bear only the withholding tax, if any, that may be
imposed under the U.S. tax treaty with the country in which the holding com-
pany is established. Under the section 904(d)(3) look-through rules, these pay-
ments will often be general limitation income and, as a result of bearing a foreign
tax burden that is well below the 34 percent U.S. corporate tax rate, will be
useful in absorbing excess foreign tax credits generated by other general limi-
tation income that is subject to a relatively high foreign tax burden. Under
current law, for example, interest and royalties paid by an operating company in
Czechoslovakia are exempt from Czech withholding tax (or in some cases roy-
alties are subject to a 5 percent withholding tax) if paid to an Austrian company
while a 25 or 30 percent withholding tax is applicable if the interest or royalties
are paid directly to a U.S. corporation.
F. TREATMENT OF A NONCONTROLLING INVESTMENT
If the U.S. corporation acquires (through an interposed holding company) 50
percent or less of the voting power or the value of the stock of the foreign
operating company, the foreign operating company will not be a controlled
foreign corporation, and the section 904(d)(3) look-through rules will not apply
to the payments of dividends, interest, and royalties it makes to the holding
company. As a consequence, interest and royalties will usually be characterized
in the hands of the holding company for foreign tax credit limitation purposes as
foreign personal holding company income, which is passive income. 48 To the
extent that interest and royalty payments received by the holding company are
distributed as actual dividends or deemed distributed as constructive dividends to
the U.S. parent, they retain the character of passive income under the section
904(d)(3) look-through rules for foreign tax credit limitation purposes in the
hands of the U.S. parent. Hence, this income will usually be subject to the
section 904(d)(1)(A) separate foreign tax credit limitation for passive income and
cannot be blended with general limitation income.
More importantly, dividends from the noncontrolled operating company are
characterized for foreign credit limitation purposes in the hands of the holding
company and the U.S. parent as dividends from a noncontrolled section 902
corporation. As noted above, these dividends are subject to the special foreign
tax credit limitation under section 904(d)(1)(E) and cannot be blended with any
48. I.R.C. § 904(d)(2)(A)(i) (West Supp. 1991). There are a number of exceptions to this general
rule. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 954(c)(2)(A), (c)(3)(A)(i)-(ii) (West Supp. 1991).
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other foreign source income for foreign tax credit purposes. Accordingly, in this
situation, the reduction in the withholding tax can represent a real savings in tax
only when the total foreign corporate income and withholding taxes on the
dividend exceed the 34 percent U.S. tax on dividends from the foreign operating
company.
The reduction in withholding tax may represent an absolute savings with
respect to earnings of the noncontrolled joint venture corporation in the Eastern
European country distributed as dividends to the Austrian holding corporation
and then on to the U.S. investing corporation. It will represent such a savings if
the withholding tax in the source country is reduced under the applicable Aus-
trian treaty to a level that is more than five percentage points lower than the rate
of withholding tax that would apply to dividends paid by the operating corpo-
ration directly to the U.S. investing corporation. In other words, the savings in
withholding tax in the source country that is gained by interposing the Austrian
holding company must exceed the 5 percent Austrian withholding tax on divi-
dends paid by the Austrian holding company to the U.S. investing corporation,
which would not be imposed if the holding company were not interposed.
If earnings are accumulated in the Austrian holding corporation, although they
would be deemed distributed as Subpart F constructive dividends to the U.S.
parent, the savings will be larger since the Austrian withholding tax will not be
incurred.
VIII. Conclusion
A U.S. corporation making a direct investment in an operating company in
certain Eastern European countries may achieve significant tax savings by having
its investment held by a wholly owned Austrian holding company rather than by
holding it directly. These savings result because under current law the withhold-
ing taxes on dividends, interest, and royalties paid by an operating company are
lower under the Austrian treaties with certain of these countries than the with-
holding taxes that would apply if the dividends, interest, and royalties were paid
directly by the operating company to the U.S. corporation. The potential savings
will exist unless and until the United States enters into tax treaties with these
countries that reduce the withholding taxes on dividends, interest, and royalties
to the levels achieved under the existing Austrian tax treaties with these coun-
tries. The reductions in withholding tax on the dividends, interest, and royalties
under the holding company structure are more likely to produce benefits if the
operating company is a controlled foreign corporation than if it is not, but even
if it is not a controlled foreign corporation, the reduction in withholding taxes
may represent a significant potential savings.
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